I completed my PhD at University College London, in 2009. Prior to taking up this post I have held posts at University College London, Wadham College Oxford, The University of Southampton, King’s College London, and University College Oxford. I also teach some classes for the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London.
I am interested in ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. My main area of research focuses on free will, determinism, and moral responsibility. I have written about the importance of alternative possibilities in the free will dispute, revisionist views of freedom and moral responsibility, the idea of supervenient freedom, and luck objections to incompatibilist accounts of free will. I am also presently working on the relation between causation and moral responsibility, the bearing of determinism on deontic morality more broadly, and some of the practical issues surrounding free will scepticism.
This year, I am teaching General Philosophy, Mill’s Moral Philosophy, and Ethics, among other things.
- ‘The Demand for Contrastive Explanations’, Philosophical Studies, online version, pp. 1-15 (paper version forthcoming), 2018.
- ‘Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock’, Disputatio, 9(45), pp. 219-43, 2017. Co-authoredwith Dr Tuomas K. Pernu.
- ‘Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative possibilities’, Acta Analytica, vol. 32, pp. 169-91, 2017.
- 'Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability’, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 166, No. 3, pp. 553-73, 2013.
- ‘Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification’, Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 212-25, 2013.
- Reprinted in: Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will, edited by Maureen Sie and Derk Pereboom, Routledge: 2016.
- ‘Scepticism, Responsibility, and Other Prickly Topics’, Analysis, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 107-18. (Part of a book symposium on Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs), 2013.